

Introduction to comparative study of bureaucracy: the recent development of empirical research and data collection

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Brief self-introduction


- Assistant Professor at the Institute of Public Administration, Leiden University, the Netherlands
- Ph.D. Indiana University, the U.S.
- The Quality of Government Institute, Sweden
- Teaching & research interest
 - Comparative public administration and management
 - Quality of government
 - Bureaucratic structure
- Editorial board member: *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration*, *Korean Journal of Policy Studies*
- Publications
 - *Public Administration Review*, *Governance* (2), *Journal of European Public Policy*, *Public Management Review* (2), etc.
- Recent works
 - "Is Impartiality Enough? Government Impartiality and Citizens' Perceptions of Public Service Quality" *Governance* (with Mehmet Akif Demircioglu)
 - "Politicization, Bureaucratic Legalism, and Innovative Attitudes in the Public Sector". *Public Administration Review* (with Victor Lapuente)
 - "A comparative study of COVID-19 responses in South Korea and Japan" (with M Jae Moon, Tae in Park, Kentaro Sakuwa). *International Review of Administrative Sciences*

Topics

- Studies of bureaucracy in political science
- Recent critiques of public management approach
- The Quality of Government approach
- Quantification of Weberian bureaucracy
- Empirical results
- Others

Bureaucratic Structures, Managerial Characteristics, and Government Performance

- Q. How do administrative characteristics of bureaucracy and characteristics of decision-makers affect the performance of government and broader social outcomes?



Questions

- What is politics?
- What is administration?
- What tasks belong to politics/administration?
- Which is important for you as a citizen?

Where is bureaucracy in political science?

Figure 1.2 A word cloud of the 60 most popular keywords in political science, based on 10,000 articles published in the top 20 journals over the last ten years



Toshkov, D. (2016). *Research design in political science*: Macmillan International Higher Education.

Where is bureaucracy in political science?

- Bureaucracy is simply ignored or overlooked in political science?
- Or bureaucracy as just object of political control?
- Meier, K. J., & O'Toole Jr, L. J. (2006). Political control versus bureaucratic values: Reframing the debate. *Public Administration Review*, 66(2), 177-192.
 - “Since 1982, a distinct line of research in political science has focused on **political control of the bureaucracy**”
 - “Bureaucratic variables themselves, however, are **largely ignored** in most studies of this genre” (see table 1).
- Fukuyama, F. (2013). What is governance? *Governance*, 26(3), 347-368.
 - “The state, that is, the functioning of executive branches and their bureaucracies, has **received relatively little attention** in contemporary political science” (Fukuyama 2013, 347)

Questions

- What countries are usually covered by the class readings you read in class?
- Do you think that public management practices which work well in the United States should also work well in Mexico?
- Any example?

Meanwhile in the public management literature

- Increased scholarly interest in **contextual and comparative factors** in public management and administration
 - O'Toole Jr, L. J., & Meier, K. J. (2015). Public management, context, and performance: In quest of a more general theory. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 25(1), 237-256.
 - Meier, K. J., Rutherford, A., & Avellaneda, C. N. (Eds.). (2017). *Comparative Public Management: Why National, Environmental, and Organizational Context Matters*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
 - Peci, Alketa, and Marcelo Fornazin. 2017. "The knowledge-building process of public administration research: a comparative perspective between Brazil and North American contexts." *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 83:99-119.
 - Bertelli, Anthony M., Mai Hassan, Dan Honig, Daniel Rogger, and Martin J. Williams. 2020. "An agenda for the study of Public Administration in Developing Countries." *Governance* 33 (4):735-748. doi: 10.1111/gove.12520.

And (recent) critiques in public management

*“The field of public management is incomplete because it ignores basic questions about the capacity and purpose of the state. It assumes that all states are alike—that **Mexico is just like the United States, for example**—and that all states can perform certain basic tasks adequately. This is a mistake. Public management research needs to treat the state as a variable rather than a constant”* (Milward et al. 2016, 312)

Milward, Brint, et al. 2016. "Is public management neglecting the state?" *Governance* 29 (3):311-334.

- Country-level contextual factors are usually overlooked in studies of public management
- Do managerial tools and practices and administrative reforms (pay-for performance, NPM, performance measurement, co-production, cutback management, etc.) work in similar ways in any countries or any local governments within the same country?

Recent critiques in public management

- Roberts, A. (2018). The Aims of Public Administration: Reviving the Classical View. *Perspectives on Public Management and Governance*, 1(1), 73-85.
 - “PM..has been most firmly rooted in a very small number of advanced welfare states”
 - “the enterprise is still “dominated by western (especially American) scholars, institutions, and publishers” and heavily shaped by western preoccupations”
- Schuster et al. 2020. "(Un) principled principals,(un) principled agents: The differential effects of managerial civil service reforms on corruption in developing and OECD countries." *Governance* 33 (4):829-848.
 - “Alleged “best practices” in public management in OECD countries may thus be “worst practices” in developing countries”

Recent critiques in public management

- Bertelli, A. M., Hassan, M., Honig, D., et al. (2020). An agenda for the study of Public Administration in Developing Countries. *Governance*, 33(4), 735-748.
 - “public administration research has unduly neglected developing countries”
 - “three major public administration journals—the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (JPART), Public Administration Review (PAR), and Public Administration—**devoted less than 10%** of their total annual article budgets to studies focused on developing countries (7.8, 9.4, and 9.5%, respectively)”
 - “**Governance was an outlier** in this respect, with 39.2% of all articles in this period including a strong developing country focus, though showing significant variation from year to year”
- Gulrajani, N., & Moloney, K. (2012). Globalizing Public Administration: Today's Research and Tomorrow's Agenda. *Public Administration Review*, 72(1), 78-86.
 - “administrative research on the developing world published in leading international publications has become a small-scale, disparate, descriptive, qualitative, and noncomparative subfield **dominated by researchers from the global North**”
- Beagles, Jonathan E., Sabina Schnell, and Catherine Gerard. "Overcoming Parochialism in American Public Administration." *Perspectives on Public Management and Governance* (2019).
 - “The field of public administration in the United States suffers from a chronic case of **parochialism** (Jreisat 2005; Riggs 1998).”

The Quality of Government approach

- [The Quality of Government \(QoG\) Institute](#), University of Gothenburg, Sweden
- Importance of “output” side of the political system (Rothstein 2009)
 - “Input side” of the political system is overrated
 - Political legitimacy depends on **the quality of government (i.e. output side of the political system)**, not on the input side
- Input side
 - Political equality, one person one vote
 - Provides losers with some hopes for next chance
 - Freedom of expression between elections
 - Clean elections
- **Output side**
 - Bureaucratic quality and capacity
 - Quality of public services
 - Quality of policy implementation
 - Absence of corruption, discrimination, and similar violations of the principle of impartiality in exercising political power

The Quality of Government approach

- Why it matters? (Rothstein 2009)
 - Outputs affect citizens' daily life and immediate welfares
 - Outputs side may have life threatening impact on citizens
 - In particular, ethnic and linguistic minorities




FIG. 1

Easton, David. "An approach to the analysis of political systems." *World politics* 9, no. 3 (1957): 383-400.

The Quality of Government approach

- Focus on **characteristics of policy implementation body** (i.e. bureaucracy)
- **Impartiality in decision making** as a theoretical core of good government (Rothstein & Teorell 2009)
 - “When implementing laws and policies, government official shall not take into consideration anything about the citizen/case that is **not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law** (Strömberg 2000)”
 - When public officials handle the cases of ordinary people, there should be **little arbitrariness and biases** in their decision making (i.e. no nepotism, cronyism, or discrimination)
 - Impartiality=non-discrimination & equal treatment of citizens under the law
- **Meritocracy in bureaucracy**
 - Meritocratic recruitment of civil servants
 - Lower political influence in bureaucratic decision making
- **Weber’s model** of bureaucracy

The Quality of Government approach

- **Positive empirical results between Weber's model of bureaucracy and various macro-level outcomes**
 - Positive macro-level outcomes including socioeconomic development (Evans and Rauch 1999; Nistotskaya, Charron, and Lapuente 2015; Rauch and Evans 2000)
 - Corruption prevention (Charron et al. 2017; Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2012a)
 - Regulatory quality and entrepreneurship (Nistotskaya and Cingolani 2016)
 - Scientific productivity (Fernández-Carro and Lapuente-Giné 2016), innovation outputs (Suzuki and Demircioglu 2018)
 - Civic actions (Cornell and Grimes 2015)
 - Political legitimacy, satisfaction with government, and support for democracy (Boräng, Nistotskaya, and Xezonakis 2017; Dahlberg and Holmberg 2014; Rothstein 2009)
 - Administrative effectiveness (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017).

Classic empirical study

- Evans, P., & Rauch, J. E. (1999). Bureaucracy and growth: A cross-national analysis of the effects of "Weberian" state structures on economic growth. *American sociological review*, 64(5), 748-765.
- First attempt to quantify "Weberianness" among countries
- Exploring correlation, not causation
 - Growth in GDP/capita (1970-1990)- "Weberianness" scale
- Sample size
 - 35 countries (mostly developing countries)
- "Weberianness" scale
 - Ten **expert survey questions**
 - Focusing on ministries/agencies in charge of economic policy
 - **Meritocratic recruitment & rewarding predictable career ladders**

Evans & Rauch (1999)




Figure 1. Scattergram Showing Relationship between Weberianness Scale Score and Unexplained Growth in GDP per Capita, 1970 to 1990

- Which of the following descriptions best fits the role of these agencies in the formulation of economic policy.
 - (1) Many new economic policies originate inside them.
 - (2) Some new policies originate inside them.
 - (3) They rarely originate new policies.
- Approximately what proportion of the higher officials in these agencies enter the civil service via a formal examination system?
 - (1) Less than 30%
 - (2) 30-60%
 - (3) 60-90%
 - (4) More than 90%
- What is roughly the modal number of years spent by a typical higher level official in one of these agencies during his career?
 - (1) 1-5 years
 - (2) 5-10 years
 - (3) 10-20 years
 - (4) Entire career
- What prospects for promotion can someone who enters one of these agencies through a higher civil service examination early in his/her career reasonably expect? Assuming that there are at least a half dozen steps or levels between an entry-level position and the head of the agency, how would you characterize the possibilities for moving up in the agency? [NB. more than one may apply.]
 - (1) In most cases, will move up one or two levels.
 - (2) In most cases, will move up three or four levels.
 - (3) Will move up several levels to the level just below top political appointees.
 - (4) In at least a few cases, will move up to the very top.
- How common is it for higher officials in these agencies to spend substantial proportions of their careers in the private sector, interspersing private and public sector activity?
 - (1) Normal
 - (2) Frequent but not modal
 - (3) Unusual
 - (4) Almost never
- How would you estimate the salaries (and perquisites, not including bribes or other extra-legal sources of income) of higher officials in these agencies relative to those of private sector managers with roughly comparable training and responsibilities?
 - (1) Less than 50%
 - (2) 50-80%
 - (3) 80-90%
 - (4) Comparable
 - (5) Higher
- If bribes and other extra-legal perquisites are included what would the proportion be?
 - (1) Less than 50%
 - (2) 50-80%
 - (3) 80-90%
 - (4) Comparable
 - (5) Higher
- Over the period in question (roughly 1970-1990) what was the movement of legal income in these agencies relative to salaries in the private sector?
 - (1) Declined dramatically.
 - (2) Declined slightly.
 - (3) Maintained the same position.
 - (4) Improved their position.
- This variable was created from the combined responses of all experts for each country, based on an assessment of the importance of civil service examinations for entry into the bureaucracy.
 - (0) No civil service exams, or exams are of trivial importance.
 - (1) Ambiguous based on experts' responses.
 - (2) Civil service exams are an important component of entry to the bureaucracy.
- Among graduates of the country's most elite university(ies), is a public sector career considered:
 - (1) The best possible option.
 - (2, 3) Depends on circumstances.
 - (4) A second best option.

Evans & Rauch (1999)

- Why Weberian bureaucracy (i.e. meritocratic recruitment and rewarding career ladders) leads to economic growth?
- Increases minimal competence
- Generate corporate coherence and *esprit de corps* (leading to higher motivation)
- Internalized shared norms
- Reduce corruption among officials
- More long-term oriented
- But, see recent study (Cornell et al. 2020)

Questions

- What are the key characteristics of Mexican civil service system and bureaucracy?
- Compared to the U.S., Sweden, Japan, and other Latin American countries?
- Compared to other countries, to what extent do you think Mexican civil servants are influenced by politics in terms of personnel?
- Compared to other countries, to what extent do you think civil servants in Mexico make neutral decisions free from political influence?

QoG Expert Survey data

- [QoG Expert Survey publicly available](#)
- Dahlström, C., Lapuente, V., & Teorell, J. (2012). Public administration around the world. In S. Holmberg & B. Rothstein (Eds.), *Good Government: The Relevance of Political Science* (pp. 40-67). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Background
 - “Very few large cross- country comparisons where the organization of the bureaucracy is actually incorporated”
 - Several cross-national indicators on the outcomes of bureaucracy
 - “Yet no cross- country datasets on bureaucratic structure exist. The sole exception is Peter Evans and James Rauch’s pioneering work”
- Expert survey data
 - 2nd waves (2012 & 2015)
 - 159 countries
 - 1294 experts

QoG Expert Survey data

- Various characteristics of bureaucracy measures and survey items
 - Recruitment and careers of public employees
 - Replacement of public sector employees
 - Preconditions and tasks for public employees
 - Policy making and implementation
 - Women in public sector
 - Impartiality
 - Corruption and embezzlement
 - Transparency and control
- Index
 - Impartiality
 - Bureaucratic professionalism
 - Bureaucratic closedness

QoG Expert Survey data

- **Measures of bureaucratic professionalism and closedness/openness**
 - **Focus on personnel system of bureaucracy**
- **Bureaucratic professionalism**
 - Degree of political influence in recruitment and promotion of civil servants
 - Professional vs. politicized public administration
- Respondents are asked to select their response from 1 (hardly ever) to 7 (almost always).
 - (1) “When recruiting public sector employees, the skills and merits of the applicants decide who gets the job”
 - (2) “When recruiting public sector employees, the political connections of the applicants decide who gets the job”
 - (3) “The top political leadership hires and fires senior public officials”
 - (4) “Senior public officials are recruited from within the ranks of the public sector.”


Dahlström & Lapuente (2017)

- Incentives of bureaucrats matter
- Why?
- Separate career
 - Mutual checks and balances through different accountability mechanisms
 - Politicians: electorate
 - Bureaucrats: professional peers and norms
 - Recruitment and promotion depend on performance, not on personal contacts and connections
 - Meritocratic recruitment ensures **staffing independent** and **competent civil servants**
 - Such recruitment practices attract more competent professional public servants with relevant skills and ensure “**credible commitment**” to public services (Miller & Whitford, 2016).

Dahlström & Lapuente (2017)


- Open and closed systems
 - Career distinctiveness of public service
- **Closed systems**
 - Public service careers are restricted through formalized exams
 - Public employees enjoy life-time tenure protection
 - Special labor regulations are applied to public sector employees
- **Open systems**
 - Career mobility of officials who switch between public and private sectors
 - More diverse and flexible access to the public sector
 - Less distinction between the public and the private

Degree of meritocracy: OECD countries




- a. When recruiting public sector employees, the skills and merits of the applicants decide who gets the job.
- b. When recruiting public sector employees, the political connections of the applicants decide who gets the job.
- g. The top political leadership hires and fires senior public officials.
- h. Senior public officials are recruited from within the ranks of the public sector.

Degree of meritocracy: Latin America & Caribbean countries



Source: QoG Expert Survey (2015)

Degree of meritocracy




Source: QoG Expert Survey

Government impartiality


Source: QoG Expert Survey

The index is constructed based on the mean values of the following five survey items: (1) “Firms that provide the most favorable kickbacks to senior officials are awarded public procurement contracts in favor of firms making the lowest bid”; (2) “When deciding how to implement policies in individual cases, public sector employees treat some groups in society unfairly”; (3) “When granting licenses to start up private firms, public sector employees favor applicants with whom they have strong personal contacts”; (4) “Generally speaking, how often would you say that public sector employees today, in your chosen nation, act impartially when deciding how to implement a policy in an individual case?”; and (5) “Hypothetically, let’s say that a typical public sector employee was given the task to distribute an amount equivalent to 1,000 USD per capita to the needy poor in your country. According to your judgement, please state the percentage that would reach: The needy poor.”


Government impartiality: OECD countries



Government impartiality: Latin America & Caribbean countries




Government impartiality




Source: QoG Expert Survey (2015)

Degree of bureaucratic closedness: OECD countries



(1) 'Public sector employees are hired via a formal examination system,' (2) 'Once one is recruited as a public sector employee, one remains a public sector employee for the rest of one's career,' and (3) 'The terms of employment for public sector employees are regulated by special laws that do not apply to private sector employees.'

Degree of bureaucratic closedness: Latin America & Caribbean countries




Source: QoG Expert Survey (2015)

(1) 'Public sector employees are hired via a formal examination system,' (2) 'Once one is recruited as a public sector employee, one remains a public sector employee for the rest of one's career,' and (3) 'The terms of employment for public sector employees are regulated by special laws that do not apply to private sector employees.'

Characteristics of effective public administration

- Findings from cross-national empirical studies
- Positive impacts of impartial and meritocratic bureaucracy
 - Socio-economic development (Evans & Rauch, 1999; Nistotskaya, Charron, & Lapuente, 2015)
 - Corruption prevention (Charron, Dahlström, Lapuente, & Fazekas, 2017; Dahlström, Lapuente, & Teorell, 2012a)
 - Regulatory quality and entrepreneurship (Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016)
 - Scientific productivity and innovation (Fernández-Carro & Lapuente, 2016; Lapuente & Suzuki, 2020; Suzuki & Demircioglu, 2019)
 - Economic activities or infrastructure efficiency (Crescenzi, Di Cataldo, & Rodríguez-Pose, 2016; Kyriacou, Muineló-Gallo, & Roca-Sagalés, 2019; Rodríguez-Pose & Garcilazo, 2015)
 - Environmental outcomes (Povitkina & Bolkvadze, 2019)
 - Government effectiveness (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017)

Meritocratic and impartial bureaucracy and innovation



Note: Samples are based on model 1.

Suzuki & Demircioglu (2019)

Figure 1. Administrative characteristics, knowledge and technology outputs.

Lapiente & Suzuki (2020)

- Background
 - Most previous empirical studies focus on bureaucratic structure and macro-level outcomes
 - Very little attention has been paid to how bureaucratic structure influence behavior of individual bureaucrats from a cross-national perspective
 - Previous innovation studies are dominantly single country studies
- Research question
 - How do types of bureaucracies influence senior civil servants' attitudes toward innovation in the public sector

Lapuente & Suzuki (2020)

- Data sets
 - the COCOPS (Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future) Executive Survey on Public Sector Reform in Europe (Hammerschmid 2015)
 - the QoG (Quality of Government Institute) Expert Survey Dataset II (Dahlström et al. 2015)
- Professional vs. politicized bureaucracy
 - the importance of an innovation-inducing, competitive job market for public managers
 - personnel systems suffering from political interference and limited job mobility face major obstacles for inducing pro-innovation attitudes
 - if the level of political appointments is low and public officials perceive they will be judged on their job performance, they may be more motivated to innovate
- *Hypothesis 1: The more bureaucratic careers depend on their political connections rather than the merits and capabilities of the candidates, the less public managers will show pro-innovation attitudes.*

Lapiente & Suzuki (2020)

- **Closed vs. open bureaucracy**

- Bureaucratic legalism is another obstacle to pro-innovation attitudes and approach
- If job openings are closed to external candidates, public administration may become a “monocracy” (Thompson 1965), few dare to challenge the status quo as innovation goes against the traditions and conventions of the bureaucracy
- If public officials expect to move to other government (or private) agencies, they will prioritize the overall impact of their innovations for their own professional reputation in the whole public sector, and the whole society, rather than the acquiescence of their immediate hierarchical superior.


- *Hypothesis 2: The more closed a civil service system is, the less public managers will show pro-innovation attitudes.*

- **Legal background**

- professional norms and values may shape the innovative behavior of bureaucrats (Brehm and Gates 1997; Lipsky 1980) and politicians (Shipan and Volden 2006).
- Legal values: entitlements, uniformity, and the search for predictability, legal security, and procedural fairness
- Managerial values: needs, adaptation to clients’ requirements, and the search for efficacy, effectiveness, and efficiency (Painter and Peters 2010b; Pierre 2011)
- Effects of legal education

- *Hypothesis 3: Public managers with a law degree will have weaker pro-innovation attitudes than managers without such a degree.*



Innovative attitudes






Results


- The **bureaucratic politicization** of an administration and the **law background of public managers** matter
- Public managers working in politicized administrations and those whose education includes a law degree exhibit lower pro-innovation attitudes (i.e., receptiveness to new ideas and creative solutions and change orientation).



- Predicted Probabilities of Openness to New Ideas and Creative Solutions by Law Professional Background



- Predicted Probabilities of Willingness to Challenge the Status Quo by Law Professional Background



Cross-national studies on bureaucracy

- Large-scale data collection on comparative bureaucratic behavior is still in its infancy
- Shortage of quantitative comparative research (Jeannot, Van de Walle, & Hammerschmid, 2018; Van de Walle, Hammerschmid, Oprisor, & Stimac, 2016; Wynen & Verhoest, 2016)
- OECD Governance at Glance
 - Only OECD member countries plus
- [Worldwide Bureaucracy Indicators](#)
 - Mostly developing countries
- QoG Expert Survey third wave
- V-dem data set
 - Impartiality measure in panel data

Other efforts to promote cross-national studies of bureaucracy

- *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration*'s special issue
 - Government capacity, quality, and governance outcomes in the Asia Pacific region ([link](#))
 - Special issue co-editors: Victor Lapuente & Kohei Suzuki
- Swedish Research Council-funded research project, "Why are some civil servants more committed to professional norms than others?"
 - Victor Lapuente & Kohei Suzuki
 - Survey experiments for local civil servants in Sweden, Spain, and Japan
 - 2020-2022
 - What types of civil servants are more responsive to political requests or committed to professional norms?
 - Under what conditions do civil servants maintain neutrality? etc.
 - Please join AOPSSS on June 30, 2021 for our pre-analysis plan presentation.
 - <https://aopsss.org/schedule/why-are-some-public-managers-more-committed-to-professional-norms-than-others-an-experimental-survey-proposal-at-municipal-level/>
- It would be nice if we could include Mexico in our research in the future!

Suggestions for future study

- Systematic review is needed
 - Increasing number of studies on the effects of politicization and quality of government on governance outcomes
 - Systematic review is not widely used in political science
- Cross-national data of bureaucracy
 - Civil servants' attitudes
 - Bureaucratic characteristics
- Micro administrative data collection
 - Individual level hiring data
 - Promotion pattern, etc.

Suggested key readings

- Milward, B., Jensen, L., Roberts, A., et al. (2016). Is public management neglecting the state? *Governance*, 29(3), 311-334
- Evans, P., & Rauch, J. E. (1999). Bureaucracy and growth: A cross-national analysis of the effects of "Weberian" state structures on economic growth. *American sociological review*, 64(5), 748- 765.
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Thank you!

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